

BETHEL SEMINARY LIBRARY

REG 170.9 K36

Kennett, Rob Early ideals of righteousness



3 0513 0000 1015 3

EARLY IDEALS OF
RIGHTEOUSNESS
HEBREW, GREEK, AND ROMAN

BY

PROF. R. H. KENNETT, B.D.

MRS ADAM, M.A.

PROF. H. M. GWATKIN, D.D.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023

EARLY IDEALS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS

EARLY IDEALS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS

HEBREW, GREEK, AND ROMAN

BY

PROF. R. H. KENNETT, B.D.

MRS. ADAM, M.A.

AND

PROF. H. M. GWATKIN, D.D.

EDINBURGH

T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET

1910

Printed by

MORRISON & GIBB LIMITED

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

LONDON: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT, AND CO. LIMITED.

NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS.

The Library
BETHEL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
ST. PAUL MINNESOTA

S39648

PREFACE

THE Committee of the Vacation Term for Biblical Students, at Girton College, Cambridge, in the Long Vacation, 1909, proposed as a subject for special study *Sin and Holiness* in various aspects. In addition to courses of lectures dealing with Biblical and modern views of the subject, the Committee desired to set before their students three single lectures, which should summarise the Ideals of Righteousness formed by three great nations of antiquity, the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans. These lectures form the contents of the following pages.

CONTENTS



I.

	PAGE
HEBREW CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS AND SIN .	1
BY PROF. R. H. KENNETT, B.D.	

II.

GREEK IDEALS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS . . .	31
BY MRS. ADAM, M.A.	

III.

ROMAN IDEALS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS . . .	69
BY PROF. H. M. GWATKIN, D.D.	

I.

HEBREW CONCEPTIONS
OF RIGHTEOUSNESS AND SIN.

BY PROFESSOR R. H. KENNETT, M.A., B.D.

I.

HEBREW CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS AND SIN.

IT will perhaps be felt by some that it is unnecessary to discuss Hebrew conceptions of righteousness and sin, inasmuch as the Scriptures of the Hebrews have become the Scriptures of the Christian Church, and the Church has accordingly taken over the teaching of the Hebrews on these subjects. But unfortunately the Hebrew Scriptures are known to the Christian Church only in translations; and although the English versions of the Bible have been made with the most scrupulous care, a translation can seldom produce the atmosphere of the original. Indeed it may even be affirmed that the very punctiliousness with which the Bible has been translated is often one of the main reasons why we fail to grasp its meaning. It seems, for example, a reason-

able canon of translation to adopt as far as possible a uniform rendering for a Hebrew or Greek word, wherever it occurs, and this canon Biblical translators have usually accepted. Unfortunately, however, it is but seldom that a word in living speech exactly coincides in meaning with a word in a dead language. Speaking generally, we may say that in course of time there is a tendency to use words in a more precise and special sense : that is to say, whereas an ancient language groups together under one word a number of ideas which are all developments of one original idea, a later language provides a separate word for each of these, so that their common starting-point tends to be entirely forgotten. The translator therefore perpetually finds himself in a dilemma : he has to choose between making the meaning of a passage clear at the cost of obscuring its connexion with other passages, on the one hand ; and, on the other, shewing its connexion with other passages by uniformity of rendering at the cost of obscuring its real meaning.

Now we English people are trained almost from infancy to make distinctions which to a

Hebrew were practically unknown. We distinguish, for example, between the good and evil of actions themselves, and of the motives which prompted them. Again, we are accustomed to limit such words as "sin" and the like to actions definitely dealt with in Holy Scripture,—actions which we are conscious to be distinctly at variance with our religion. Whether this limitation is justifiable in view of Christ's teaching is open to very grave doubt; yet, as a matter of fact, it is certainly true that most people would hesitate to speak of a man as a "sinner," because, for example, he had been fined by the magistrates for riding a bicycle without a light. In apologising for some inconvenience which we had unwittingly inflicted on a friend, we should never dream of saying that we had "sinned" against him! A Hebrew, however, knew no such distinctions. He did not, as a rule, exercise himself much about motives, but regarded things almost entirely from an external point of view, and judged from the visible results. Again, in his language cause and effect were not easily distinguished. To him *work* (*p^eullā*) was primarily the means by which he earned a

certain payment; and he accordingly used the word to denote also *payment for work, wage, or recompense*. Similarly he used all words for "sin" and their antitheses in a forensic sense, that is to say, he regarded them from the point of view of a police-court official. In his eyes a *sinner* was a *convict*, a *righteous* man one declared *not guilty*, over whom, therefore, no punishment impended. To be sure, a convict *may* be perfectly innocent of the offence for which he is sentenced to punishment; but in the eyes of the law the verdict of the jury has constituted him a criminal. In much the same way we commonly understand by the word *criminal* not so much a person who is actually guilty of some great wickedness, but a person who is convicted of a serious charge.

In like manner, in Hebrew, though the word ḥattā (*sinner*) may mean, and primarily does mean, one who commits a sin, one who comes short, that is to say, of a standard of righteousness, it is more commonly used somewhat in the sense of the English word *convict*, to denote *one who by the verdict of circumstances stands in the position of a criminal*. A

good illustration of this use may be found in 1 Kings 1²¹, where Bath-sheba is represented as saying to David, if we adopt a consistent translation of the Hebrew, "It shall come to pass, that when my lord the king sleepeth with his fathers, I and Solomon my son will be *sinner*s." It is obvious that the mere fact of Adonijah's accession would not make Bath-sheba and Solomon morally worse than they had been before; but it is equally obvious that, Oriental government being what it is, they would be obnoxious to the king, and therefore *in the position of criminals*. The force of circumstance, like an English jury, would, so to speak, have pronounced them guilty.

Sin, therefore, to Hebrew modes of thought, may mean not only the failure to conform with a standard of righteousness, but also the outcome, or what viewed externally might be regarded as the outcome, of such failure. Similarly *‘āwôn*, which means primarily *error*, is used commonly to denote the *status* of one who has left the right way, the *guilt* of transgression which renders a man liable to punishment; so that, though it never actually

denotes *punishment*, the latter word would often be a better rendering than *iniquity*. So also *āshām*, which is primarily an offence committed against a person, may be also the money compensation paid; *ḥattāth* (*sin*) may mean not only, like *ḥēt*, the *actual wrongdoing* and the *status of one who sins*, but even the *sin-offering*, which, so to speak, is a seal to the release of the offerer from the *status of a sinner*.

Since, then, by *sin* a Hebrew commonly meant the *result* of sin, or what appeared to be such, it is not surprising that the Old Testament frequently represents people as having sinned against God who, at least to our way of thinking, are perfectly innocent. Thus in the story of Abimelech and Sarah (Gen. 20⁹), Abimelech is represented as saying, "Wherein have I sinned against Thee, that Thou hast brought on me and on my kingdom a great sin?" It is plain that the uprightness of Abimelech's *motives* was recognised by the narrator (see v.⁶), but it is equally plain that he nevertheless thought that the wrong unwittingly done to Abraham had already brought punishment on Abimelech's house

(v.¹⁸), and that still further trouble threatened Abimelech (v.³) if Sarah were not restored.

Thus in the story of Saul and Jonathan's campaign against the Philistines (1 Sam. 14) it is related that the failure to procure an oracle was regarded as proof that a sin had been committed (v.^{36ff.}). Although no one was conscious of having offended in any way which should cause Jehovah to withdraw His help from the Israelite army, every one present, even Saul himself, considered that he might be convicted as the sinner. Finally, the lot pointed to Jonathan as the guilty person. Yet Jonathan pleaded guilty to no offence save the breaking of (in our eyes) an unreasonable taboo on food, of the very existence of which he was unaware. We gather from the story that no one disputed his *guilt*; he was, however, rescued from death, not as being *not guilty*, but as being worthy to receive a free pardon in consideration of the good services which he had done for his people.

Similarly in 2 Sam. 6 we have a description of the death of Uzzah, who fell dead at the bringing up of the ark, and is said to have

been smitten by God because he put out his hand to the ark. In this account it must be confessed modern sympathies go with Uzzah against the narrator of the story. If Uzzah had not put out his hand to the ark, it would have fallen with a crash on the ground ; and it seems to us far more reasonable, and far more reverent, that a holy vessel should be touched even by a layman than that it should be allowed to fall ! But this was not the Hebrew's way of looking at the matter. To him God's holiness was *physical* holiness, which could not be brought into contact with anything ceremonially unclean or common without causing automatically an outburst of punishment ; just as in a coal mine, fire-damp, when it comes in contact with a flame, explodes and brings death, it may be, not only to the careless miner who has carried a naked light, but to many innocent men as well. Another instance of the (to us) curious mode of thought by which the guilt of a sin is regarded as resting upon an innocent community, is seen in the law of Deuteronomy (21¹⁻⁹). Here the discovery of a murdered man is taken as evidence that guilt lies upon the

community in whose territory the body is found, which will therefore be liable to punishment unless the guilt be expiated; and the particular community whose duty it is to expiate the guilt is determined by the mechanical process of measuring which city is nearest to the place where the body is found. In such a case it is perfectly obvious that *sin* or *guilt* in our sense of the term would not necessarily rest on the nearest city, inasmuch as the murderer might have come from a place far distant. To a Hebrew, however, bloodshed was incompatible with the holiness of God, and would therefore, unless expiation were made, bring down wrath. Expiation involved a certain amount of trouble and expense, and the question was, who should bear this.

We may illustrate the law just referred to by practices in our own country. It was formerly the custom, if an offence were committed in the neighbourhood of Fordwich near Canterbury, to decide where the offender should be tried as follows. If a man from a boat in the middle of the river Stour could throw an axe weighing seven pounds beyond

the place where the offence was committed, the offender was tried, and, if found guilty, punished at Fordwich. In this case the community on whom lay the "guilt" of the offence (according to the Hebrew point of view) was, as a matter of fact, determined by the strength of the arm of the man who threw the axe. When the place of the offence was near the boundary of the "liberty" of Fordwich, the question whether Fordwich was to have the trouble and expense of a trial, and possibly of the subsequent punishment of the offender, was settled by a method of measurement which must have presented a large element of uncertainty.

Similarly, at the present time, if a man deserts his wife and family, the "guilt" of his action (from the Hebrew point of view), or at any rate its consequences, consisting in the expense entailed in keeping the destitute persons, must fall on the innocent ratepayers of the community. But this "guilt" is repudiated by those ratepayers who are able to show that the family to be supported has no settlement in the parish where it has been deserted, and is placed on the ratepayers of

the district in which the deserting husband and father had previously lived.

If it can be remembered that the Hebrews regarded outraged holiness as requiring expiation, just as a deserted wife requires to be kept, there is a sufficiently close parallel between ancient Hebrew and modern legal methods. For it was considered by the Hebrews that "guilt" unexpiated must certainly be followed by disaster, as it is considered certain by ourselves that a contaminated water supply will bring disease on the district in which it is found. And as at the present day a municipality will take upon itself the expense of disinfecting a house in which there has been, for example, an outbreak of smallpox, in order to safeguard the community; so in ancient Israel, the community undertook the expiation of "guilt" in its midst, or, as we might put it, the disinfection of the sin-contaminated area, in order to safeguard the whole. We shall do an injustice to Hebrew thought, if we imagine that the narrators of Old Testament stories, such as those to which I have referred, intended to represent these outbursts of

Jehovah's wrath as due to passionate anger at breaches of laws arbitrarily laid down by Him. They regarded Jehovah's holiness as something which in *its very nature* was incompatible with sin, whether that sin was adultery, the breaking of a taboo, or even the mere bringing of holiness into contact with that which was common. From their point of view it did not appear that Jehovah threatened Abimelech, or refused to answer Saul's request for an oracle, or put Uzzah to death, from any animosity to any of these men ; but, as we recognise that certain things are incompatible with the divine nature (*e.g.* God cannot deny Himself), so it seemed to the Hebrews that God could not direct His holiness to that which was incompatible with it, without punishment following. It is for this reason that so much stress is laid upon holiness, not, indeed, holiness in the modern ethical sense of the word, but as meaning the absence of all that is ceremonially unclean.

Thus in Deut. 23¹⁴ it is stated that "the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and to give up thine enemies before thee ; therefore shall thy camp

be holy: that He see no unclean thing in thee, and turn away from thee."

Thus, since the ground where Jehovah has manifested His presence is holy, the shoes must be taken off, lest by any chance some uncleanness be brought into contact with His holiness. So also the Holy Mount must be fenced off from all contact with what is common or unclean. It is probable that in both these cases the Hebrews did not regard the punishment which followed upon a transgression of these ordinances as mere vengeance taken in anger, like the wrath of a man whose private grounds, which he would be at liberty to throw open to the public, have been trespassed upon; but rather as the *inevitable* and *natural* consequence of bringing into contact with holiness what was incompatible with it.

And since this conception of the consequences of sin was almost universally held among the Hebrews, it was no difficulty to them to believe that innocent men (as we should account them) as well as guilty might be involved in it. If there is an explosion in a coal mine, the innocent miners who have

observed every precaution meet with the same fate as the careless miner who has caused the explosion. The Hebrew, however, would regard them as all alike *bearing guilt*, inasmuch as the event had, so to speak, inflicted the same punishment upon them. Similarly, nowadays, the governor of a prison to whose custody a number of convicts had been committed, would regard them all alike as *convicts*, whereas in reality there might be innocent men among them. Of course, there is a natural presumption that a convict is actually guilty of the offence of which he is convicted, and it is not surprising that in like manner the Hebrews argued that the infliction of trouble upon a man was sufficient evidence of his guilt.

We indeed, in the light of the teaching of the Book of Job and of our Lord, see the fallacy in this mode of arguing. But to those who had not yet learnt that God makes perfect through suffering, and chastens those whom He loves, the inference to be drawn from the evidence of suffering appeared unmistakable. If God, who was omnipotent, and might therefore have averted calamity, allowed

calamity to come, there seemed no escape from the conclusion, unless men were to impugn God's justice, that the calamity was deserved. In other words, suffering and punishment were practically synonymous. It must not, indeed, be forgotten that the stories of the Old Testament to which I have referred, occasion difficulty to modern English readers for another reason. Probably most of us who have reached middle age grew up with the idea—whether it was ever explicitly taught us, it would be hard to say—that all those who in the Bible are described as having perished by the wrath of God, were not only punished in this world but in the world to come. To be cut off in one's sin, seemed to imply an eternity of torment. With the hereafter, however, the Hebrew did not concern himself. In his view death was, at least ordinarily, the end of punishment, the end of the *status* of a sinner. St. Paul shews the same point of view when he says that "the death which Christ died, He died to *sin* (i.e. the *status* of a sinner) once," and "he that is dead is freed from sin."

We have seen that calamities which from

the Hebrew point of view were regarded as due to sin, frequently involved a whole community; and, this being the case, it was natural to regard the *guilt* or *sin* as resting upon the whole community. Thus in the story of 1 Sam. 14, the lack of a response from the oracle as to whether it will be safe to attack the Philistines, affects the whole army of Israel. In the story of 2 Sam. 21, the famine causes suffering to the whole of David's kingdom, and therefore the whole kingdom is regarded as bearing the *guilt* which caused the famine. In this case the original wrong-doing which has offended the Divine holiness is Saul's breach of faith with the Gibeonites. In order to appease the Gibeonites, therefore, it seemed natural to give up the family of the man who had brought the guilt upon the country.¹

¹ In the story of the Gibeonites we notice a curious characteristic of Hebrew belief, namely, that a curse once given is irrevocable unless it has been nullified by the person who originally uttered it. It is only in the latest stage of Old Testament revelation that we get the teaching that "the curse causeless will not come" (Prov. 26²). It is implied that Saul's treatment of the Gibeonites has made them *curse* Saul, and desire that his family may be exterminated as he has attempted to exterminate them. Until, therefore, the

To us it seems intolerable, as indeed it did to more developed Hebrew thought (cf. Deut. 24¹⁶), that innocent men should be put to death to expiate a sin committed by an ancestor; but to the more primitive Hebrew way of thinking our mode of thought was quite foreign. This is due not only to the fact that the community or family was to the Hebrews a *unit* in a way which it is not to us, but also to the absence of any conception of natural law among them. We know, indeed, that in a mine explosion, such as I have imagined, the innocent men could only be exempted from the consequences of the explosion by a miracle—that is to say, by God's interference with natural law. But the Hebrews would have regarded such an explosion as the result of *a sentence pronounced by a Divine Judge*, whose officers would merely carry out what He had decreed; in the same sort of way as an execution nowadays is the result of a

curse can take effect on Saul's family, it is compelled to work on Saul's land; cf. 1 Sam. 20¹⁶ and Zech. 5³⁻¹¹. *Seven* of Saul's descendants are probably a composition accepted in lieu of the whole family.

sentence passed by an earthly judge. We realise that children, perhaps to many generations, suffer through the sin of an ancestor, and we cannot imagine a world so ordered that this would not be the case ; but, since we distinguish between suffering and punishment, we should not state the fact quite as it is stated in the second Commandment. And as the Hebrews felt no difficulty in supposing the children to be punished for the sins of their fathers, so it was equally natural for them to suppose that they would benefit by the righteousness of their fathers. Thus David's righteousness benefits all his future descendants : Jehu's righteousness, his descendants to four generations.

In course of time, however, this old conception of punishment or reward began to shock men's ideas of justice. It is obviously impossible to assign an exact date to an idea, as we can assign a date to some definite historical event ; but, as far as we are able to trace the growth of thought, the demand for justice for the individual first arises in the latter part of the seventh century B.C., though it is not very prominent at this early

date. We see it in the protest put into the mouth of Abraham in Gen. 18^{23ff.} Some-what later we have an example of it in the law of Deut. 24¹⁶, and in much later times in the protest put into the mouth of David in 1 Chron. 21¹⁷. It is but natural that in a book which, like the Book of Job, is concerned primarily with the problem of suffering, this difficulty should be felt; and as a matter of fact Job asserts (21¹⁹) that the guilt of a wicked man ought not to be laid up for his children, but to be visited upon the man himself.

Apart from the Book of Job, Ezekiel is the most strongly individualist of all the Old Testament writers, and his convictions as to what is just in punishment will be shared by most modern Christians. The careless watchman through whose neglect people perish, is to be held guilty for their death (Ezek. 3^{16ff.}, 33); no man will be held guilty by God for another man's sin (Ezek. 18); nor will he be able to deliver another by his righteousness (Ezek. 14). Ezekiel's teaching, however, labours under this disadvantage, that in his age men had not learnt to discriminate between

things natural and things spiritual. Ezekiel appears to be feeling after that sense of *life* and *death* which we find in St. Paul ; but it is certain that most, if not all, his hearers would understand by the former physical advantages, and by the latter either actual death or physical disadvantages. It cannot, therefore, be denied that there is observable among several of the Old Testament writers a disposition to look below the external circumstances. Ezekiel evidently considers that the careless watchman is more guilty than the man who has perished by his carelessness ; and still later writers declare that God examines motives, *e.g.*, cf. 1 Sam. 16⁷, 1 Kings 8³⁹, Jer. 20¹², Ps. 7⁹. Yet this disposition has had no effect on the ordinary *phraseology* of the Old Testament. Ezekiel himself speaks of the man who perishes through the watchman's carelessness as "dying in his iniquity." Since the Hebrews argued from what they actually saw in this life, they never got over the idea that God requites what is actually done rather than what the heart has desired to do. How little they thought of *motives* may be seen from the story of Jacob's

blessing.¹ Jacob the deceiver obtains a blessing which God alone could give.

We have seen that, according to Hebrew belief, trouble follows automatically upon the contact of Jehovah's holiness with sin. No doubt, theoretically, Jehovah was considered to be omniscient; yet, inasmuch as He was commonly regarded anthropomorphically as a King governing according to Oriental methods of government, it was not unnatural that people should speak of Him as only taking account of certain things to which His attention was directed. The common expression for punishing is to *visit a man's transgressions upon him*, i.e., to scrutinise on a man the guilt which he bears. If Jehovah's scrutiny is directed to guilt, punishment, it is felt, must follow, unless the guilt be removed. God may indeed *pass by* the transgression—that is to say, He may, so to speak, avert His

¹This fact will help to explain the remarkable belief among the ancient Hebrews, already referred to on p. 18, namely, that a blessing or curse once given is irrevocable. It was generally considered that no one could annul a curse or blessing except Jehovah Himself. Thus the curse on the land of Judah is represented by Zechariah (5⁵⁻¹¹) as *transferred* to the land of Shinar, where it will produce the same calamities which it has produced in Judah.

eyes from it, so as not to see it (cf. Acts 17³⁰), or He may cover it over, with the same result ; but if He looks at it, He either punishes it, or lifts it off the person who bears it. There is little or no idea in the Hebrew Bible of such a thing as the *sentiment* of forgiveness existing together with the consequences of sin.

A former headmaster of a certain school used to assure his pupils, when he whipped them, that he forgave them ; but a Hebrew boy under such circumstances would have had grave doubts of his master's veracity. When a Hebrew thanked God for forgiving all his sin, he was giving thanks for the fact that no cloud obscured the brightness of his life. When Nathan assured David that the Lord had put away his sin, he meant merely that the extreme penalty of death which Uriah's death demanded would not be inflicted. And since in words expressive of forgiveness it is not the sentiment of forgiveness which is contemplated by the Hebrews, but only, so to speak, the sterilising of the infection which produces disease and death, it is not surprising that they talk of *forgiveness* where to modern notions the word appears inapplicable. Thus

the verdict of acquittal in the trial of Joshua (Zech. 3^d) is pronounced in the words, "Behold, I have caused thine iniquity to pass from thee." Joshua, that is to say, is not left in the dock, but is reinstated in his office as an innocent man. What is contemplated is the cessation of the trouble which Joshua has undergone, and which is symbolised by his trial. The words cannot be quoted to prove that Joshua had been guilty of what we should call *iniquity*. In this respect English *legal* procedure corresponds to a great extent with Hebrew idiom. If it is proved that a man condemned to penal servitude is innocent of the offence of which he has been found guilty, he is released, not by the declaration that he ought never to have been imprisoned, but—so sweetly reasonable is English law—by receiving the King's most gracious pardon.

It cannot, of course, be denied that many passages in the Old Testament which speak of the removal of guilt may be said to be "fulfilled," *i.e.*, to receive a fuller meaning, in the Church's experience of the removal of the sense of guilt; but this fact, which few will wish to gainsay, must not make us shut our

eyes to the historical meaning of the Old Testament. We must be on our guard, lest we press into the service of dogmatic theology phrases which were originally used in a meaning quite different from that which is assigned to them in modern Christian devotional use. Above all, it must be remembered that, since in the thought of a Hebrew writer words for *sin* and *righteousness* have so wide a range, *it is impossible to be consistent in an English translation*. The same writer will use such a word in two consecutive sentences in meanings which could only be rendered in English by different words. Thus (Rom. 6¹⁰) St. Paul states of Christ that "the death which He died, He died unto sin once," evidently using "sin" in the sense which it commonly bears in the Old Testament, of the *status* of one regarded as a sinner, who is therefore liable to punishment. One who has suffered the extreme penalty no longer possesses this *status*, but is, as St. Paul has said in v.⁷, "justified from sin"; he is, that is to say, in the position of one who, having worked out his sentence, is in the sight of the law an innocent man. Yet in v.¹², and apparently

in v.¹¹ also, "sin" is used not to denote the *status* of a sinner, but rather in its natural English sense.

And as *sin* or *guilt* frequently means the *status* of one considered guilty, who therefore dreads a punishment, so *righteousness* often denotes the *status* of one considered not guilty, one who has no fear of any penalty. Thus in Deut. 24¹³ the consequence of observing the law is stated thus: "And thou shalt have righteousness before the Lord thy God"—that is to say, "thou shalt have the *status* of one declared not guilty." Similarly in Ps. 24⁵, after a description of the sort of man *who is qualified by his righteousness* to stand in the Lord's holy place, we read, according to the Revised Version, "He shall receive a blessing from the Lord, and righteousness from the God of his salvation." In this sentence, according to the rule of Hebrew parallelism, the thought of the first clause is repeated in a more emphatic manner in the second clause: the *blessing* which the righteous man receives is that he is given the *status* of a righteous man on whom no ill can come.

So also in the familiar phrase of Jer. 23⁶,

“the Lord is our righteousness,” the word “righteousness” is not employed in any ethical sense, but in accordance with the usage just described; and inasmuch as cause and effect are, as has already been pointed out, frequently represented in Hebrew by the same word, it is here used in the sense of that which *causes the status of a righteous man*. Jehovah is to us the cause of our receiving those blessings which imply the non-imputation of guilt. According to the same idiom, St. Paul, perhaps imitating the phrase in Mic. 5⁵, says of Christ that “He is our peace” (Eph. 2¹⁴).

Similarly in Isa. 60¹⁷, the prophet declares that Jehovah will make Zion’s officers peace, and her exactors righteousness: and in the same book (58⁸) the promise is given, “Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thy healing shall spring forth speedily: and thy righteousness” (*i.e.* thy general welfare) “shall go before thee; the glory of the Lord shall be thy rearward.”

A little thought will generally shew the precise sense in which words for *righteousness* and *sin* are used. It cannot, however, be too

strongly insisted upon, that these senses are often to our notions widely different, even more different, for example, than the idea of *testament* is from *covenant*.

It is hard to estimate the injury which has been done to our faith by the well-meant but ill-judged attempts to give one limited meaning to each of these words denoting *sin* or *righteousness*. There are not a few of us who look back to the theory of the Atonement in which we were brought up, and which was founded on the supposed Biblical teaching of sin and righteousness, as to an intellectual and spiritual bondage.

The old theory as to God's righteousness too often came into violent conflict with the only definition of righteousness which we felt to be tenable. With a freer, more truly reverent study of Scripture, there has come to us a clearer insight into the love of God which passes knowledge; a deeper thankfulness for Him who is indeed in the Hebrew sense "our righteousness"; a more earnest desire that, inasmuch as in Christ we have died to "sin" (in the Hebrew sense), sin (in the English sense) may no more have

30 CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS AND SIN

dominion over us ; a more victorious strength in the knowledge that we have received not the spirit of bondage, but the spirit of adoption, and that we are no more under law but under grace.

II.

GREEK IDEALS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS.

II

GREEK IDEALS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS.

IN attempting to deal with the large field implied by the title of this lecture, we must recognise from the outset that in a single hour we can only dwell on a few salient points. If we wish to fix our minds on the highest developments of Greek religious thought, we must pass rapidly over earlier stages, and avoid altogether the temptation to spend our time in considering the ideals of righteousness to be found in the Homeric poems, or the still more primitive germs that can be traced in the study of mythology and ritual. It has been well said by Dr. Edward Caird that Plato may justly be called the first systematic theologian, and the keynote of all Plato's teaching is that God and man are akin, not in the sense that God is developed by man's thought after his own image writ large, but

that God is the supreme creative principle which Plato identifies with perfect Goodness, and that man is "not an earthly, but an heavenly plant,"¹ whose proper function is "assimilation to God, so far as it is possible for a human being."²

If we take this doctrine as our central point, we may be able to shew, first how it has been derived and expanded from earlier efforts to set before mankind the true goal of his endeavour; secondly, how it took shape in Plato's own mind; and lastly, how it was modified by his successors, especially by Aristotle and the Stoics. To the Greek of Homer's day virtue is the natural result of a life spent in a harmonious environment, and untroubled by adversity. There was for him no sense of opposition between his own nature and that of the world about him; it did not occur to him to question the rightness of his natural impulses; and so long as life went well, and no infatuation caused him to overstep the law of moderation, by displaying a spirit of arrogance towards his fellow-men or the gods, his path was easy. If he went astray, it was

¹ Plato, *Tim.* 90 A.

² *Ibid.* *Theaet.* 176 B.

owing to some baleful influence, to Ate, the eldest daughter of Zeus, or to Zeus himself, who would blind him and deprive him of his wits.¹ "Delicate are the feet of Ate," says Agamemnon, pleading excuse for his own errors, "for not upon earth she goeth, but walketh over the heads of men, making men to fall; and entangleth this one and that."² But when the day of misfortune came, it struck at the root of his uprightness. "For wide-seeing Zeus takes away half of a man's virtue, whenever the day of slavery lays hold on him"³—these are the pathetic words of the chief of Odysseus' household, himself a slave who had risen above his fellows to a sense of affection and loyalty to his absent master.

This cheerful acceptance of man's nature as being disposed to walk aright, provided that his powers and instincts are duly guided, and not warped by hardships or excessive prosperity, runs throughout the whole course of Greek thought. As Zeller has pointed out,⁴ it marks the fundamental difference between

¹ Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 51. *Il.* xix. 136.

² *Il.* xix. 92 ff.

³ *Od.* xvii. 322.

⁴ *Phil. der Griechen*, i.⁵ 123.

the Greek and the mediæval view of life. The Greek sought to find the divine in nature, both in universal nature and in mankind. The mediæval Christian looked upon nature as ruined by sin and worthless until regenerated. As philosophy progressed, the chasm between nature and spirit gradually opened before the eyes of the Greek thinkers, but to the end they held that right education in accordance with natural laws would produce a righteous character. Aristotle, who sees clearly the disposition of man to go wrong at every turn, finds no necessity for any cleansing process before implanting the seeds of virtue. "It is," he says, "neither by nature nor in defiance of nature that virtues are implanted in us. Nature gives us the capacity of receiving them, and that capacity is perfected by habit."¹ Similarly, the Stoics defined the chief good for man as a life in accordance with nature, not as a life whose aim it should be to suppress natural impulses and to supplant them by new ideals. Even Plotinus, the great founder of the Neo-Platonic school, who held that man in his individuality has fallen from

¹ *Eth. Nic.* 1103a, 23 ff., tr. Welldon.

his high estate of union with the divine Absolute, still maintained that his descent is never complete, but "always the soul leaves something of itself above,"¹ and consequently the true nature of the soul is akin to the universal Reason, towards which it will mount by the aid of virtue.

In reading Hesiod and the elegiac poets we are conscious that their outlook on life is very pessimistic. Hesiod feels keenly the hardship of man's struggle for mere existence. Man's lot is unending toil, and troubles beset him on every side—"the earth is full of evils, and so is the sea";² such is the summing-up of human life in Hesiod's view. The one chance of lessening the woes of life is to labour honestly and strenuously, and he who follows this course will find virtue as his reward. Justice is enjoined by the poet continually; but by justice he means not only kindness to friends and to the helpless, but the law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, or rather of two eyes in return for one, since he goes so

¹ *Enn.* iv. 8. 8 οὐ πᾶσα οὐδ' ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἔδν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ αἰεί. See E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, ii. p. 295.

² *O. D.* 101.

far as to say, "If thy comrade is the first to do thee an unkindness either in word or in deed, forget not to requite him twofold."¹ In Homer we have seen that it is deemed to be the nature of mankind to walk uprightly if external circumstances are propitious; to Hesiod it seems as if circumstances could never be propitious, and virtue could only be the outcome of a prolonged struggle with adversity.

In the lyric and elegiac poets also we find a sense of the helplessness of man in the hands of the gods who rule the world. The fear of punishment for wickedness is more prominent than the hope that virtue will meet with reward, and we do not meet with many indications that righteousness is to be desired for its own sake. Rather, these poets, and among them more especially Theognis, are perplexed by the puzzle of a world where the wicked flourish as a green bay tree. Theognis would fain have it pleasing to Zeus that the virtuous children of an unjust father should escape suffering for his misdeeds; "but as it is," he says, "the doer escapes and another thereafter

¹ *O. D.* 709 ff.

bears the evil.”¹ How can it be right that the innocent should suffer unjustly, and what man can reverence the immortals, when he sees an unjust and presumptuous man, who shuns not the wrath of man or gods, live wantonly, sated with wealth, while the just are worn away, pining under cruel poverty?²

In those early times it is clear that the ideal of righteousness was far more negative than positive. It consisted in avoiding as far as possible any conduct that might give occasion to the wrath of the gods. To that end all proper observances must be duly carried out, and acts of aggression towards human beings must be shunned for fear of consequences. Apart from this, it was desirable to get through life as comfortably as might be, for there was little or no hope of redressing miseries in a future state. Even in Æschylus, with all his lofty conceptions of duty and patriotism, it is the fear of divine vengeance rather than a love of virtue that inspires his heroes' action. The might of Zeus overshadows every other thought with him, “for,” says he, “what is brought to

¹ 741 f.

² 743-752.

completion without Zeus?"¹ Human righteousness sinks into insignificance before Zeus, "the king of kings, most blessed among the blessed, of perfect powers most perfect."² If mankind err, punishment is swift; if they do aright they may prosper; but their welfare, material or moral, is of little moment to the "cause of all things, the doer of all things" (*παναίτιος, πανεργέτης*).³

Sophocles is less absorbed than Æschylus in the contemplation of the divine majesty and power. For him piety, a virtue born of reverence for the gods,⁴ takes the place of moderation as man's highest excellence, and the love thus engendered casts out fear as the mainspring of righteousness. Zeus is no longer solely the awful dispenser of doom, but "he hath Mercy for the partner of his throne."⁵ On the strength of this Polyneices pleads, though in vain, with his father Œdipus for forgiveness of past injuries, saying, "Shall mercy not also find a place by thee, my

¹ *Ag.* 1488, tr. Headlam.

² *Suppl.* 533 ff.

³ 1486 f.

⁴ Dronke, *Die relig. u. sittlichen Vorstellung des Aesch. u. Soph.* p. 66.

⁵ *O. C.* 1268 ff.

father?" In illustration of this passage, Sir Richard Jebb aptly quotes the *Merchant of Venice*¹—(mercy): "It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, It is an attribute to God himself; And earthly power doth then show likest God's When mercy seasons justice"; "and my husband has pointed out the parallel with St. Paul in the *Ephesians*,² "Be ye kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another, *even as God also in Christ forgave you.*"

The same softened conception of the divine character is seen also in the *Philoctetes*,³ where the sufferings of the hero are said to have been laid upon him "by the care of one of the gods," in order that he, the foreordained vanquisher of Troy, might be held in reserve until the appointed hour. His troubles, mysterious though they be, are unhesitatingly deemed to be part of God's plan for the guidance of the universe. With Æschylus such misfortunes are, I think, without exception the penalty paid for wrong-doing, either on the part of the sufferer or of his

¹ iv. i. 194 ff.

² iv. 32; Adam, *R. T. G.* p. 179.

³ Dronke, *l.c.* p. 68; Soph. *Phil.* 196.

ancestors. Not so with Sophocles; he views the problem of human suffering with the eye of faith, and in proportion as he sets before him an ideal of an all-powerful divinity, who is merciful, loving, and gracious, so does it become easy for him to bear patiently with the evil and suffering in the world, in the serene belief that were man's vision wide enough, he would see joy and sorrow to be parts of one harmonious whole. He is the first of the Greek thinkers to bring forward love and sympathy with the weak and erring as an attribute of the divine character, and consequently the first to furnish the motive of an answering love and reverence on man's side towards God as the spur to urge the human race to righteousness. Assimilation to God now becomes not only possible, but the whole duty of man, though neither Sophocles nor yet Plato, a still greater expounder of the doctrine, was able to anticipate Christianity in so working upon the hearts of men as to cause this conception of the ethical ideal to prevail.

Turning to Pindar, we find him likewise insisting on the kinship of God and mankind.

“One,” he says, “is the race of men and gods, and from one mother we both derive the breath of life; but in power we are altogether diverse; for the race of man is nought, whereas the brazen heaven abides, a dwelling-place unshaken for ever. Howbeit we bear some likeness to the immortals, in lofty mind perchance, or in bodily nature, although we know not what course our master Fate hath mapped out for us to run, either by day or in the watches of the night”¹ (Professor Bury is here followed in the translation of the opening words, ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν θεῶν γένος). But although to Pindar the gods are frankly anthropomorphic, suffering the same necessities and enjoying the same pleasures as man, the links binding heaven and earth are not nearly so strong as in Sophocles. The gods are glorified presentments of humanity, but we miss for the most part that sense of the divine care—I was almost going to say fatherhood—and sympathy which we have seen to be so strongly developed in the mind of Sophocles. The gods go on their happy way rejoicing, and concern themselves very little

¹ *Nem.* vi. 1 ff., tr. Adam.

with the weal or woe of mortals. It would seem as if Pindar tried to make up for the failings and defects of human creatures by allowing his imagination to dwell upon a kindred race, who should be free from these imperfections. These beings have power for good or ill over mankind, whose duty it is to obey their behests, and worship them with admiring reverence; they do not, however, supply the true motive for personal righteousness, namely, responsive love, given freely in return for the providential watchfulness of heaven. Hence Pindar does not advance beyond the old idea of moderation as the chief human virtue. Arrogance or covetousness—these are the sins which he constantly urges mankind to avoid, and his favourite exhortation is the formula “nothing in excess,” which he repeats in ode after ode, with characteristic wealth of expression. As instances let us take the following:¹ “If a man cherish his wealth to sound ends, having a sufficiency of goods and adding thereto fair repute, let him not seek to become a god”; and again: “Seek not to be as Zeus; if the portion of these honours

¹ *Ol.* v. 24 f., tr. Myers.

fall to thee, thou hast already all. The things of mortals best befit mortality.”¹

We have now to leave for a while the great names of Greek literature, and to glance at the difficult subject of Orphism, on account of the ideal of purification from the flesh which the Orphics strove to approach in life, and which they believed to be attainable through a long series of expiatory periods of purgatory and reincarnation. Our knowledge of the Orphics has been pieced together by many scholars from a great variety of sources—allusions in classical literature, Plutarch and other late writers, Christian Fathers, inscribed tablets found in tombs, vase-paintings, sculpture, and so forth. They appear to have found their way into Greece in the sixth century B.C., and to have set on foot a kind of revival movement. Some of their doctrines were reproduced by Pindar and several philosophers, notably by Empedocles and Plato. Orphic votaries were in the habit of forming themselves into religious communities, which, so far as we know about them (but no contemporary evidence exists), seem to have

¹ *Isth.* iv, 14 ff., tr. Myers.

been dissenting bodies, yet probably did not refuse to take their share in the State ritual.¹ On its bad side, Orphism consists of a mass of superstitious, and even magical ceremonies, but it has a spiritual aspect of great importance. Starting from the doctrine that the body is the tomb of the soul—*σῶμα σῆμα*—the Orphics proceeded to lay down laws of life, whereby the end of deliverance from the prison-house might be—not achieved, for that could only come after a cycle of reincarnations, but brought nearer. External purity was strictly enjoined, but we have no reason to suppose that an inward cleansing of the soul was not also requisite.² From the Orphics, Plato gathered his most characteristic doctrine, that the soul is not an earthly, but a heavenly plant, “rooted in the celestial element,” as a late Orphic line has it.³ What sinful aberration caused it to descend into its bodily prison is not clearly described; but being down, its desire and its task is to reascend with all the speed it may. The way is long and toilsome.

¹ Adam, *R. T. G.* p. 94.

² Miss Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 478.

³ See Gruppe, *Gr. Myth.* p. 1035.

“Already,” says Empedocles, “I have been a youth and a maid, a bush, a bird, and a mute fish out of the sea.” Between the various phases of incarnation there are periods of reward and punishment,—the principal punishment being to wallow in mud,¹—and the heaven, whether final or intermediate between two incarnations, being a paradise wherein the inhabitants pursue their former intellectual and religious pleasures. Plato,² indeed, declares that the fairest reward of virtue with the Orphics is “an eternity of drunkenness,” μέθη αἰώνιος, and this is likely to be not untrue of degenerate Orphism. For us, the main point to notice is that the soul’s natural home is in heaven. She has forfeited her birthright, it is true, for a while, but her aspirations are to return to that imperial palace whence she came; and no regeneration or redemption is needed to enable her to do so, except a gradual deliverance from the clogging and contaminating influence of the body. She is hampered and entangled, but her true nature is not destroyed. In this lies the great difference between the Orphic and

¹ Plato, *Phaed.* 69 C.

² *Rep.* 363 C.

the mediæval doctrine of the fall of man. It is the presence of matter which is the bane of the soul, and all her efforts are directed towards ridding herself of this noisome garb.

In discussing any point connected with Greek religious views or ideals, it is impossible to omit Euripides; and yet his destructive and questioning attitude makes him a source of embarrassment, when it is our aim to set forth a statement of positive teaching. He is, as it were, a reed shaken by the wind, and at first sight it seems as if we can find in him nothing but iconoclasm and pessimism. "I hold with the saying found in all men's mouths, that it is best for man never to be born."¹

"Yet all man's life is but ailing and dim,
And rest upon earth comes never;
But if any far off state there be,
Dearer to life than mortality;
The hand of the Dark hath told thereof,
And mist is under and mist above,
And so we are sick for life, and cling
On earth to this nameless and shining thing,
For other life is a fountain sealed,
And the deeps below us are unrevealed,
And we drift on legends for ever."²

¹ *Fr.* 285.

² *Hipp.* 190 ff., tr. Murray.

Such passages as these abound in the writings of Euripides, and the wreck of his faith in the old religion drives him to view the world from a purely human standpoint. Nevertheless, as Nestlé points out, there are traces of a belief in piety and goodness,¹ and in a harmonising justice.² It is significant that these signs of resistance to the crushing weight of "Weltschmerz" are to be found in the fragments of a play, the *Bellerophon*, which seems to express in a special degree the convictions of the poet himself. Bellerophon, at the point of death, thus addresses himself: "Righteous thou wert towards the gods whilst thou didst live, and ever thou wert wont to bear aid to strangers, and to be unwearied in well-doing to thy friends." With this consciousness, Bellerophon goes forward to his end in peace. In spite of his pessimistic outlook, Euripides asserts his firm belief in the worth of virtue: "No possession is of higher price than virtue; for to nought is she subject, neither to money, nor to rank, nor to the flattery of the multitude. The more thou dost desire to practise virtue, the more she

¹ *Euripides*, p. 246.

² *Fr.* 303, 304.

waxes greater, being perfected.”¹ This noble fragment is fitly followed by the next: “Virtue is the greatest good in the world.”² Nevertheless, it is, I think, true, as my husband says, “that Euripides never achieved a final and complete unification of his moral and intellectual nature.”³ Though an agnostic with a spark of hope in him, he is in the main an agnostic. He is “Euripides the human, with his droppings of warm tears”; and his deep sense of the pain and misery of human life, and also of the evil to which man’s nature is prone, coupled with his rationalistic shattering of all the old guides to life, cause him to dwell for the most part on the pitiful weakness of mortal men, rather than to use his energies in lifting them out of the abyss.

In sharp contrast to the pessimism of Euripides, even if we do not suppose him to have succumbed to despair, are the robust faith and hope of the great names with which we now have to deal, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Xenophon, in Book I. of the *Memorabilia*,⁴ gives an account of a chiding

¹ *Fr.* 1029.

³ *R. T. G.* p. 319.

² *Fr.* 1030.

⁴ i. 4, 8.

administered by Socrates to Aristodemus, a despiser of the gods, for his want of confidence in the existence of a divine intelligence as the governor of the universe. "Why," asks Socrates, "if the earth and moisture that compose your body are but a minute fraction of the material world, should you suppose that you have had the good fortune to pick up Reason from nowhere and make it your exclusive possession, while these mighty and infinitely varied substances have, according to you, found an orderly arrangement through some irrational means?" The kinship of the human and divine intelligence is the sum and substance of the teaching of Socrates; and as his faith in the goodness of God never wavers for a moment, this principle carries with it as a corollary the famous identification of virtue with knowledge. Intellectual progress signified to him a corresponding advance towards ideal or divine goodness, for by knowledge he did not mean the acquisition of science, but "a certain overmastering principle or power that lays hold primarily indeed of the intellect, but through the intellect of the entire personality, moulding and disciplining the will and the

emotions into absolute unison with itself, a principle from which courage, temperance, justice, and every other virtue inevitably flow.”¹ The conviction that some particular line of conduct is right cannot fail, if it *is* really a conviction, to produce the impulse towards such action : swerving from the straight path simply means an inadequate conception of the desirableness of virtue. We may make a series of equations to show the optimistic creed of Socrates thus : the gods or God (it was not a matter of much concern to him whether the divine rulers were manifold or single) = Reason = Goodness ; on a lesser scale, human virtue = human intelligence = the divine element in man.

How is virtue then to be cultivated ? I need hardly remind you of the method of Socrates, or of his doctrine that a life without examination or criticism is unworthy to be lived by man. It was his custom to extract from any one with whom he might be conversing a definition of some general ethical term. The next step was to adduce examples to which this definition would not apply, and to drive his unhappy companion from one

¹ Adam, *R. T. G.* p. 329.

modification to another, until at last he usually contradicted himself, and the conversation ended in the bewilderment and exasperation of the victim. Having thus destroyed the false conceit of knowledge in all and sundry, Socrates would then, never adopting the attitude of a teacher but always that of a fellow-inquirer, try to arrive at a satisfactory definition of temperance, prudence, and courage or the like; and having found one that his reason would not reject, he would apply it in all practical cases, even to the point of refusing to save his own life at the expense of acting against a principle thus formed.¹

The ordinary Greek morality almost universally upheld the doctrine of "Love your friends and hate your enemies." This rule applied both to men and to gods; and, as we have seen, the earlier ideals of righteousness caused the necessity for virtue to rest chiefly upon the fear of Olympian vindictiveness. Æschylus, it is true, protests that the "impious deed" and not merely "prosperous fortune"² begets punishment; but down to

¹ Plato, *Crito*, 46 B.

² *Ag.* 755 ff.

the time of Socrates and Plato the sinner is represented as the enemy of the gods, who receives the natural penalty of suffering and evil from his mightier adversaries. What is just dealing between gods and men, is just also between man and man. "If thy comrade is the first to do thee an unkindness either in word or in deed, forget not to requite him twofold; howbeit, if he would lead thee again into friendship, and is willing to make restitution, do not say him nay." So says Hesiod,¹ and his words are echoed by most of the earlier Greek writers. Only Pittacus of Mitylene is handed down as a dissentient. To him are imputed the maxims, "Forgiveness is better than revenge," and "Speak no evil of a friend, or even of an enemy."²

In Socrates and Plato we meet with a totally different attitude, emphasised by Socrates as opposed to the ordinary doctrine. "Though all the world agree with you," says Socrates in the *Gorgias*, "I, one man, do not agree,"³ namely, that an evil-doer can be happy, or in general, as we learn definitely

¹ *O. D.* 709 ff., tr. Adam.

² *Diog. Laert.* i, 76, 78.

³ *Plato, Gorg.* 472 B.

from the *Crito*, that it is ever right "to requite injustice with injustice, as is the general view, or to inflict evil upon any man, whatever we may suffer at his hand."¹

At the outset of this lecture we said that Plato's doctrine of man's divine origin would be our central point. We now see how from the beginning the essential similarity between men and gods had been maintained; but as the conception of the Deity gradually expanded and deepened, so the ideal of human righteousness was raised proportionately, until this crowning point was reached, that the absolute goodness of God carried with it the potentiality of a human life moulded after the divine pattern. So long as the gods were deemed to be revengeful, so long was the law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth enjoined; but a merciful and forgiving Heavenly Father implies a corresponding loving-kindness on the part of man to friends and foes alike. Whether this principle was laid down definitely by Socrates, or whether it is a Platonic development, it is hard to say; at any rate the life of Socrates was guided by it to the end,

¹ 49 C.

so that he refused to bear a grudge against the judges who voted for his death.¹ Mr. Nettleship² says most truly that with Plato the strictly human element in human nature, the *man* in us (as opposed to the ape and tiger), "is also represented as the divine in man. . . . Both Plato and Aristotle thought that there was in human nature a certain imperfect presence of God, and that it was this divine presence, however small, which made it specifically *human* nature. It is in this conception that the true anticipations of such Christian ideas as that of Incarnation—'taking the manhood into God'—are to be found. Plato literally identifies the truly human nature in us with the divine." "Is not the noble," he asks, "that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man?"³ Similarly Aristotle in speaking of a life of perfect happiness says:⁴ "If reason is divine in comparison with man's nature in general, so life in accordance with reason is divine in comparison with human life in general." The older notion had been that

¹ *Ap.* 41 D.

² *Lectures and Remains*, ii. 334.

³ *Rep.* 589 D, tr. Jowett.

⁴ *Eth. Nic.* x. 1177b, 30 f.

God was man on a larger and more splendid scale; from the time of Socrates and Plato we learn to think, not of God as made in the image of man, but of man as made in the image of God.

But according to Plato, soul, by the fact of her imprisonment in body—here follows the old Orphic doctrine of *σῶμα σῆμα*, “the body is the tomb”—is no longer purely divine and immortal, but contains a mortal element as well, which again is divided into a higher and a lower part. The divine element is Reason, and that is the link which binds us to the universal Reason or Wisdom which Plato identifies with God. “As concerning the sovereign part of soul within us,” he says in the *Timaeus*,¹ “that which we say, and say truly, dwells at the top of the body and raises us from earth towards our heavenly kindred; forasmuch as we are a heavenly and not an earthly plant, we ought to believe that God has given it to each of us as a *daemon*,” who should act as our guardian angel. The inferior or mortal part of soul consists, first, of the spirited element, which includes anger,

¹ 90 A, tr. Adam.

courage, and ambition ; and secondly, of the appetitive element from which spring all the bodily desires. These two should be the servants, or, as Plato puts it in the *Phaedrus*, the two horses, which are under the sway of the charioteer Reason. One horse is willing and obedient to the command of its master ; the other is recalcitrant, and if it should get the upper hand, great is the disaster.

Though confinement of the soul in a bodily prison hampers the free action of Reason, the guiding principle, and renders it liable to temptation and error, yet it never loses its right to pride of place owing to its celestial origin. Heaven and earth meet in the compound that forms the human soul, but man should be ranked according to the immortal, not according to the mortal element in him. No one has expressed Plato's thought more clearly than George Herbert in the poem called *Man's Medley*. The first three verses run thus :

"Heark, how the birds do sing,
 And woods do ring,
 All creatures have their joys : and man hath his.
 Yet if we rightly measure
 Man's joy and pleasure
 Rather hereafter, than in present, is.

To this life things of sense
 Make their pretence :
 In th' other Angels have a right by birth :
 Man ties them both alone,
 And makes them one,
 With th' one hand touching heav'n, with th' other earth.

 In soul he mounts and flies,
 In flesh he dies.
 He wears a stuffe whose thread is coarse and round,
 But trimmed with curious lace
 And should take place
 After the trimming, not the stuff and ground."

Thus man is a heavenly and not an earthly plant, and is a heavenly plant in virtue of the rational or philosophic element in him. Further, it is by the training and exercise of this philosophic element that he uplifts himself towards the Divine Wisdom or Absolute Goodness,—for to Plato the terms are synonymous,—and accordingly, philosophy or the love of knowing becomes a hunger and thirst after righteousness, or, as Plato sometimes describes it, a consuming desire for Divine Beauty. In order to develop a love of virtue in the individual, the child must be carefully nurtured on whatsoever things are lovely and of good report in literature and art. Thereby the pupil will learn to detect what is right in the world through the study

of its image in art, and he will acquire the essentially Greek virtue of *σωφροσύνη*, temperance or restraint, together with the habit of good order and a true love of the beautiful.¹ In other words, the mind will be dyed so that its instinctive perception of right and wrong will be indelible. So far, training in virtue can be received by all alike; but for the noblest natures, that is to say, those in whom the philosophic element predominates, a further education is requisite. In Plato's view the craving for all manner of knowledge is the germ of all human excellence, inasmuch as the passion for truth quells the bodily appetites, leaves no room for pettiness, and must be coupled with intellectual superiority.² The true function of education is to turn the eye of the soul round—literally, to convert it—from the ground where she is rooted, upward to the light whence she derives her origin, and to teach her that she is truly a heavenly plant. To attain this end a prolonged training in science and philosophy is

¹ *Rep.* 404 E, 425 A. See Nettleship's Essay in *Hellenica*.

² Nettleship, *ibid.*

needed, and none but the highest natures are capable of profiting by it. Those who can reach true wisdom must use their gifts and their knowledge for the benefit of their fellow-men, and live a life which combines the pursuit of philosophy with personal service to the community, until the time when they depart to the Islands of the Blest.

From another aspect, the training in virtue consists of a war against the irrational or animal element in man's nature. We find this chiefly dwelt upon in the *Phaedo*, where the aim of philosophy is shewn to be the struggle of the soul to free herself from the prison-house of bodily appetites. In this way philosophy becomes truly a rehearsal of death, if by death we understand with Plato the separation of the soul from the body. Since, however, this separation is the purification of the soul from the clogging elements accruing to her through her muddy vesture of decay, the terms "death" and "life" may be inverted, and the practice or rehearsal of death, according to the phrase in the *Phaedo*, is no other than the ardent passion for spiritual life and truth, described in the *Republic*, *Sym-*

posium, and elsewhere. And to sum up, the whole aim of man's life should be by means of his search after wisdom—his philosophy, in a word—to “make himself like to God as far as possible.”¹ Though his mortal nature cause him to be frail and to abound in imperfections, he must remember that he is no outcast from the heavenly regions, but a true son, whose duty it is to shed his trappings of mortality and suffer the divine beauty within him to shine forth with untarnished radiance.

I have left myself little space in which to speak of Aristotle and the Stoics. So far as Aristotle is concerned, the great apparent differences between his views and ideals and those of Plato melt away on a closer study, until it becomes hard to say whether there is any essential distinction between the two philosophers in their highest ethical teaching. Like Plato, Aristotle holds firmly that the rational faculty in man is that which links him to the Deity, and that it behoves him, as far as in him lies, “to put on the immortal”² by striving after wisdom; “for,” he continues, “if [what is best in us] is in bulk but small,

¹ *Theaet.* 176 B.

² *Eth. Nic.* 1177b, 34.

yet in power and dignity it far exceeds everything." In this way man will attain happiness and fulfil the end for which he is destined, since he will be exercising the most excellent part of his nature, and true happiness is the accompaniment of such activity in any creature. In the case of man, life according to Reason is the life that is best for him and happiest, seeing that Reason is that which makes him man, or rather that which exalts him to the level of the Divine. In his highest flights Aristotle thus comes very near to the doctrine of his master Plato, whom at other times he criticises until it seems as if he can find no point of agreement. The real difference is to be found in their respective attitudes of mind, and the way in which they present their thoughts to the hearer or reader. The tendency of Aristotle is to analyse, that of Plato to generalise from particulars to the universal. Aristotle restrains his style to the point of baldness, with the exception of a few passages, where he allows his underlying religious enthusiasm to appear: Plato loves to give rein to his imagination, and to clothe his rigid thought in dazzling raiment. Both would

desire to be regarded as strictly scientific thinkers; but with Plato the poet overpowers the metaphysician, and with Aristotle the intellect seems to be struggling, not always successfully, to eliminate spiritual fervour. To both, the highest end of man is a life of contemplative activity and aspiration after wisdom or righteousness; and in the view of both, three things are necessary for the attainment of their ideal, namely, a nobility of nature which is beyond our control, but, as Aristotle puts it,¹ comes by the grace of God to those who are truly fortunate; secondly, education; and thirdly, a preliminary habituation of the young soul to a right spirit of pleasure and aversion, like the soil that nourishes the seed, or, according to Plato's metaphor, the indelible dye that no solvent in the shape of temptation can efface. Without this third element in the formation of a virtuous character, Aristotle is emphatic that education is useless. "Wherefore," he says, "it is necessary that the disposition should first be made in a sense akin to virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base."²

¹ *Eth. Nic.* 1179b, 22.

² *Ibid.* 1176b, 29 ff.

It is the less a matter of regret to me that I cannot say more than a few words concerning the Stoics and must pass over other schools of thought altogether, seeing that much of the ground will be covered tomorrow by Professor Gwatkin, in his lecture on Roman Ideals of Righteousness. After the loss of political freedom in Greece, following on the conquest by Macedonia, the ancient religions, as Dr. Caird observes,¹ "lost a great part of their meaning, and tended to become an empty routine of ritual and observance, when they ceased to be the consecration of national and civic life." Hence the individual was driven to seek spiritual guidance for himself, and partly, owing to the shrinkage of the field for external activity as members of a community, men withdrew into the contemplation of their own life. But though the sphere of thought is lessened, the essential features remain the same. To the Stoic no less than to Plato, man's origin is in heaven, Reason is the universal law, and those who order their lives in accordance with it win happiness. In his

¹ *l.c.* ii. p. 46.

noble hymn, Cleanthes thus expresses this teaching :

“Hail, Zeus, for unto thee
Behoves thy creatures in all lands to call.
We are thy children, we alone, of all
On earth’s broad ways that wander to and fro,
Bearing thine image wheresoe’er we go.
Wherefore with songs of praise thy power I will
forth show.”

And again :

“In thine eyes
The unloved is lovely, who did’st harmonise
Things evil with things good, that there should be
One Word through all things everlastingly.
One Word—whose voice, alas! the wicked spurn ;
Insatiate for the good their spirits yearn :
Yet seeing see not, neither hearing hear
God’s universal law, which those revere,
By reason guided, happiness who win.”¹

But though the Stoic ideal of righteousness remains virtually the same as that set forth by Plato and Aristotle, the mode of expression does not always reach this level, and much of Stoicism as it has come down to us is a wilderness of somewhat barren discussion. The chief moral aim of all the post-Aristotelian schools was to secure for man the tranquillity of an individual who is at peace with himself, and has withdrawn from external

¹ *Hymn of Cleanthes*, tr. Adam.

struggle. This, the Stoics said, could be accomplished by living in accordance with nature, an ideal defined by successive Stoic teachers as life in harmony with a man's own nature,¹ life in harmony with the whole of nature,² and lastly, as life in harmony with both individual and universal nature.³

I have tried to show that through the course of Greek religious thought a single thread may be traced, in the essential unity of man and God. At first the imperfect conception of the divine nature marred the ideal held to be possible for man to reach. But, in the words of Xenophanes, "Verily the gods did not show forth all things to mortals from the beginning, but by long search they find out what is better,"⁴ until the notion of divine goodness, and consequently of the possibilities of human excellence, culminates in the inspired vision of Plato. After his time it only remained for others to give expression to his ethical ideals in their several ways. The later teachers held, as we have seen, with Plato, that man has in him a vital spark, whereby he can raise himself above the things

¹ Zeno.² Cleanthes.³ Chrysippus.⁴ *Fr.* 28.

of this earth. To Aristotle, man's chief good is "to serve God and to enjoy him for ever." Cleanthes thus prays Zeus to save his children from error's deadly sway ;

"Turn thou the darkness from their souls away ;
Vouchsafe that unto knowledge they attain ;
For thou by knowledge art made strong to reign
O'er all, and all things rulest righteously."

Finally, as an expression of simple piety summing up the whole of our subject, we cannot do better than conclude with the words of the lame slave Epictetus, written in the second century A.D.¹: "What else can I, a lame old man, do, but sing the praises of God. Nay, if I were a nightingale, I should do what belongs to a nightingale ; if a swan, what belongs to a swan. But as it is I am a rational being ; it behoves me to sing the praises of God."

¹ *Dissertationes*, i. 26.

III.

ROMAN IDEALS OF
RIGHTEOUSNESS.

BY PROFESSOR H. M. GWATKIN, D.D.

III.

ROMAN IDEALS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS.

THE history of Roman ideals is an evolution on the grandest scale, covering fully six-and-twenty centuries from Numa to Pius x., and even yet unfinished, for it still remains to be seen whether the Vatican Council will crown the edifice or break it in pieces. Its logical completion may be its political ruin. Those ideals have undergone immense changes under the influence first of Greek religion and Greek philosophy; then of the Eastern worships that came in from Egypt and Asia, Syria and Persia; and lastly, from the action of Christianity. And Christianity itself at Rome has passed through many changes as it grew up through a thousand years of Roman and barbarian domination into the proud imperialism of Hildebrandine times and then sank into the sordid misgovernment of

the later Middle Ages, to be cleansed again only by the ferocious bigotry of the Tridentine and Ultramontane reactions. But it is a true evolution, for the main ideal has been throughout unchanged. The standard of duty is neither a philosophy nor a life, but the discipline of a state. Once that state was temporal, now it is spiritual; once it was a layman's religion, now it is priestly: but the church is itself a state and enforces the discipline of a state. It sets the papal chair above the thrones of the world, and forms an *imperium in imperio* in every country, from Ireland to China.

We will begin by comparing Rome with Greece, and especially with Athens. She resembled the Greek cities in being a city-state ruled by custom and profoundly religious. The ideal of civic duty was as high in the best age of Athens as it ever was at Rome; though it declined after the Peloponnesian War and the Macedonian conquest, and was still further impaired by the individualism of later times. Still something of it lasted into Roman times, or was revived by the prosperity of the Empire.

Indeed, Rome and Sparta had a good deal in common. They were both military states and oligarchies, governed in the main by second-rate men, and narrow in their outlook. Their system of war was much the same, for they always headed an alliance. Even their language had a common turn, for *Laconism* is matched by the terseness of Latin prose. There is a touch of military precision even in the glorious collects of Leo and Gelasius. But at Sparta the ruling class was purely military, and her allies were shifting and occasional, whereas the senators of Rome were farmers also, and her alliances were permanent. Athens differed very much more from Rome. Her citizens were more sailors than soldiers, and their commercial pursuits gave them wider interests. In culture, too, there was all the difference of spirit between the theatre and the amphitheatre. So the government of Athens was more liberal and less strongly organised, and called on every citizen to take a personal and intelligent part in the work of the state.

Rome, on the contrary, was agricultural and military. Her ideals were bucolic, and

her native literature hardly got beyond rude Fescennines. The government was in the hands of the Senate and the magistrates; and even in the Senate, most of the speaking was done by a few of the seniors. The citizens as such had no daily share of the government. Thus the ideal of the good citizen was summed up in obedience to the discipline of the state. He must be a man of sober and dignified life, devoted heart and soul to the state. It was heroic—and brutal. And this ideal was not only supreme, but exclusive. There was no check to it in family life, though this again had a Spartan character, and was stronger than at Athens. If Rome gave ignorance to the matrons, she never gave culture to the courtesans. But family life was itself part of the discipline of the state. Nor was philosophy a check, for Rome had no philosophy at all till she imported it from Greece.

Least of all was religion a check on the state. The sacred colleges might use their power factiously, but they never formed anything in the least resembling a church party. The gods were not immortal men as in Greece, but formless *numina*, characterless and isolated

from each other—even from their female doubles. They formed no society, and indeed existed only each for his own particular function. As for the worshipper, he wanted to know the right god and the right formula of prayer: and this is all that he cared to know about the gods. Thus religion became a matter of ceremonial and strict bargaining. Absolute accuracy was needed for the ritual; but then the god was bound to do his part of the bargain. It was a corporate religion, for the individual approached the gods simply as a member of the state. And it was a layman's religion. It was the consul who sacrificed, and the priest was only his prompter. If a man offended against religion, his punishment came not from the gods or the priests, but from the magistrate. In short, there was nothing moral in the religion, except that it was a religion of some sort. It was simply a part of the discipline of the state, and is well summed up in the words of the emperor Valerian, as "the ceremonies of the Roman people."

Now this ideal of religion as part of the discipline of a state has persisted with little

change from Numa's time to our own. Notwithstanding the great changes in the state itself, its relation to religion has always been very much the same. That relation was little affected by the foreign elements brought in from Greece, though more so by the Eastern worships; but Christianity itself has generally been conceived in terms of the old Roman religion, and therefore subordinated to pagan ideas.

Greek influence was felt from the time of the Tarquins. But the old Italian side of the religion was still in full vigour, and the coming of a few foreign gods made little difference. The crisis was in the long struggle of the Hannibalic war. If Rome came out the victor, and thenceforth had the world at her feet, the Roman character never quite recovered its balance. There could not but be a reaction after one of the most fearful strains to which a nation has ever been subjected. The wild agony of superstition might pass away, but none the less the war left a deep mark behind. The solid yeomen of older times were replaced by an excitable city-mob. The governing classes were corrupted by the

spoil of the world, and the abundance of money and of slaves provided by the wars of conquest turned commerce into speculation and gave every facility for vice and cruelty. Both ways the old Roman dignity was undermined.

New forms of thought came in as the old decayed. If Greek worship mattered little, Greek philosophy was a potent influence ; and under the late republic and the early empire that philosophy was mostly Stoic. Epicureans and Sceptics never flourished much at Rome, and even Stoicism had to drop its physical speculations. But as a purely ethical system it suited well the austere self-reliance of the men who strove to keep up the old Roman virtues in an evil time. Thus it became a religion, or rather a substitute for religion, to the best men of the state, till in the second and third centuries it gave place to new Pythagorean and Platonic developments. Like the Empire, it threw down the barriers of nations ; and like the Gospel, it set up but one ideal of duty for the world. But that ideal was crude. The Stoic made himself ridiculous by treating every act as the result of

deliberate choice. His theory was fundamentally false, because it took no account of human nature.

Small wonder if men, and still more women, turned away from the lofty indifference of Stoicism to the warmer worships that came in from the East. With all their superstitions, disorders, and immoralities, Isis and Mithras preached purity in this life, and held out the hope of immortality to all believers. They had a moral element utterly wanting in the religion of the state, and gave the human sympathy which the Stoic scorned. In both ways they resembled the Gospel, though on a lower plane. Their idea of purity was superficial, and they never reached the secret of the Cross, that even the divine Redeemer must win his life through suffering and death.

Thus both Stoicism and the Eastern worships helped the development of the moral standard under the Empire. If Rome began as a vulgar plunderer, she slowly learned her duty to the world she had conquered. She learned that if the world was to be lost in Rome, Rome must be lost in the world. She had her reward in the steady attachment of a

conquered world which never fell away from her. So, too, the hard old Roman law was humanised in all directions. The father's despotic power was limited, the wife reached a position of freedom, and even the helplessness of slaves was not beneath the notice of the Antonine lawyers. All this was a prelude to the work of the Christian Church; but it is very clear that the heathen Empire never could have made more than a feeble beginning of that work.

One feature of the Eastern worships was asceticism. This was practically new, for there was nothing like it in the old Roman religion. The Vestals and the other few cases were rather tabus than reasoned asceticism, and even the stern self-restraint of Stoicism rested rather on a philosophical belief in the indifference of outward things than on any ascetic doctrine that there is impurity in the things of sense. But in the Eastern worships asceticism was an ideal, whether it was taken up in grim earnest by devotees or only played with by people of fashion. But an ideal it was,—that asceticism is holier than common life,—and from the Eastern worships it passed

over into the world, and from the world to Christianity.

Another new feature of the Eastern worships was a regular clergy of sacrificing priests. There were priests, indeed, of particular gods both at Rome and in other cities. But these, as a rule, were magnates who had their chief interest elsewhere, and only acted as priests on certain festivals. They were very seldom zealots. They were not a priestly class; and when the old families died out, the sacrifices were left to be performed by any one who professed to know the ritual. In strong contrast to this religious anarchy, the priests of the Eastern worships were organised bodies. They had regular services,—the Mithraists three times daily,—administered sacraments, and made it part of their duty to give spiritual counsel. This last was more than even the Jewish priests had undertaken. Under the old order, men approached the gods directly, but only as members of the state: the Eastern worships brought in a new order, where men came as individuals, but only through the mediation of a priest. And this priestly mediation also found its way into Christianity.

/

In some measure, then, the Eastern worships corresponded to the ideals of the time. They were open to all ranks, they taught the need of purity, they promised forgiveness of sins, and they spoke of life beyond the stars of heaven. At every point they are an advance, even on Stoicism; yet at every point their inferiority to Christianity is no less marked. Their government was much weaker, and more encumbered with scandals of disorder, imposture, and flagrant immorality. And weak government was the outcome of weak doctrine. They had no historic faith to guard, no sinless model to look up to and compare with their own shortcomings. So there was no depth in their idea of sin, and therefore no thoroughness in their conception of purity. Everything was slipshod—except the splendid ceremonials.

Above all, they had a divine Deliverer indeed, but no divine Redeemer. The story of the Cross is the supreme appeal of love divine to that which is divine in men: and this to the ancient world was foolishness.

Like these Eastern worships was the society of the declining Empire. It was

generally well-meaning and right-thinking. Its temper was humane in spite of its cruel government, and it seldom failed to stigmatise wrong as wrong. Its sin was rather weakness than any defiant wickedness. If it had no approval for abominations, neither had it any great indignation against them. It visited foul crimes with condemnation, but condemnation so mild as almost to be a condonation. It had the sense of sin which was utterly lacking in early times; but even the Eastern worships could not develop it. It was neither cowardice nor outrageous wickedness that ruined the ancient world, but moral weakness—the weakness of an age of superstitions lightly taken up and lightly thrown aside.

Then came Christianity, with its Founder's mighty claim to the undivided and unwavering allegiance of heart and soul and mind in every act and word and thought. His teaching was not ceremonial, for He bade us worship in spirit and truth: not ascetic, for He consecrated marriage at Cana, and cleansed all meats: not sacerdotal, for He claimed to be the one divine Mediator, and

left no sacrifices for men to offer but the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving. Yet it was just the moral tonic which the age required, calling on men for the noblest of efforts, inspiring them with the noblest of motives, and revealing to their wondering gaze the noblest of all conceptions of life in this world and the world to come. The young churches seemed to solve almost by the way the social and economic problems which defied the power of Rome and still baffle modern Europe. With all their faults—and they were not a few—there is a touch of truth in the old idyllic pictures of peace and harmony in early Christian times.

But the treasure was in earthen vessels. If the work of God for men is done by men, it must be limited by the weakness and ignorance of men, and conditioned by the thoughts of men it finds in the world. As soon as the fear of persecution was removed, the crowds of converts who pressed into the church brought with them the spirit of the world, not that of Christ. They could understand the Gospel as a somewhat better sort of Mithraism, but they never reckoned with Christ's demands

in their searching thoroughness. So the popular Christianity of the Nicene age was very superficial. Rome had her own conceptions of religion, and forced the Gospel more and more into accordance with them. The process was a work of centuries, and is not even now quite complete ; but Roman Christianity was gradually shaped into ceremonial, ascetic, and sacerdotal forms, till the Roman element of it was supreme, and the Christian subordinate. It was the discipline of a state. Monasticism, Mysticism, and the Reformation may all be understood as pleas for a personal religion not entirely dependent on the offices of the church. But the new priestly state was as omnipotent as the old heathen state, in the sense of claiming final authority over every relation of life, and allowing no reserved domain of conscience. More and more from age to age Rome set forth obedience to the church as the all-embracing ideal of duty, and summed up all sin in the crime of disobedience.

But the process was a long one, and in the first thousand years of it the church of Rome did priceless service to the Western world.

When Jupiter was dead, and Mithras was dead, and the everlasting Empire was breaking up in a world-wide overthrow, nothing was left but the Christian church to face the Northern conquerors. Nor was the church then unworthy of its mission. For centuries it stood between the old world and the new, between the living and the dead. It saved what could be saved of the old, and trained what could be trained of the new. But when the young nations grew up, Rome forgot that she was only their teacher for a time, not their mistress for ever. Her methods never ceased to be of the old Roman type, with less and less continually of the liberty of Christ, and more and more of the discipline of a state. From age to age she has steadily tightened that discipline and thrown her whole being into it, till now she is little more than a highly organised state. The catholic church of modern Rome is none the less a state for not being strictly territorial. Its ideas, its discipline, its policy, are essentially those of a secular state; and like a suzerain secular state, it claims the first and paramount allegiance of all the dwellers of the world.

Printed by
MORRISON & GIBB LIMITED
Edinburgh

OTHER WORKS BY
Prof. H. M. GWATKIN, D.D.

Second Edition, Two Volumes, 12s. net.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
AND ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

"No one can rise up from a careful study of these volumes without feeling that he has been reading an important work, and has been in contact with a master mind. They will take a high place for ripe insight, for sanity of judgment, for width of historical knowledge, for earnest devotion to truth and the search for truth."—*Guardian*.

"These two volumes will rank with the greatest modern contributions to theological thought. . . . It would be impertinence to praise this book. It is better to give thanks for it. As a manifestly frank discussion, first of the possibility and then of the probability of a divine revelation, 'The Knowledge of God' will long hold a foremost position in the library of apologetic literature."—*London Quarterly Review*.

In post 8vo, price 4s. 6d. net.

THE EYE FOR SPIRITUAL
THINGS

"Prof. Gwatkin's name is a guarantee of careful and lofty thought, of terse and luminous expression, of fairness to foe and inspiration to friend. All these qualities are present in this volume. No preacher should overlook it."—*Methodist Times*.

"These volumes are a welcome combination of brevity, lucidity, spirituality, and penetration. Sentences packed with thought, difficult subjects skilfully handled, arrest us."—*Churchman*.

T. & T. CLARK, Edinburgh and
London.

Second Edition. Demy 8vo, price 10s. 6d. net.

THE RELIGIOUS TEACHERS OF GREECE

BY

JAMES ADAM, Litt.D., LL.D.

FELLOW AND SENIOR TUTOR OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

EDITED, WITH A MEMOIR,

BY HIS WIFE

ADELA MARION ADAM

THE ATHENÆUM.—"A pathetic interest attaches to this volume as the work upon which its brilliant author was engaged at the time of his death; and containing his latest utterances on the subject to which he had devoted his strenuous life, it will be doubly valued alike by his friends and the many admirers of his scholarship. . . . It may be said at once that the lectures exhibit throughout the fine qualities which mark all Adam's work: soundness of scholarship, fullness and accuracy of knowledge, clearness and vigour of expression."

THE TIMES.—"Alike for sympathy, understanding, and literary skill we have seldom read anything better than this memoir."

HIBBERT JOURNAL.—"Dr. Adam's book is likely to hold its place for long, not only because of its learning and philosophic sight, but as a complete and worthy memorial—*consummatio totius vitæ*—of a life of constant and conspicuous devotion to the study of Greek literature and thought."

T. & T. CLARK, **Edinburgh and
London.**

5- 2.75

Kennett

170.9

K36

Kennett, R. H.

Early Ideals of
Righteousness

S39648

DATE

ROBERT A. KENNETT

170.9

K36

S39648

Bethel Seminary Library

3949 Bethel Drive

St. Paul, Minn. 55112

O6-AZL-148

